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The Senate continues to debate a Bill2 approved by the House of Representatives which
might substantially change Brazilian antitrust enforcement by merging the antitrust regu-
latory powers of the Secretariat for Economic Law ("SDE") and the Secretariat for Eco-
nomic Monitoring ("SEAE") into one single antitrust agency, the Administrative Council
for Economic Defense ("CADE").
To improve the functioning of its leniency program, SDE issued a new leniency regula-
tion aimed at increasing the procedure's transparency.3 Among other things, it clarifies
the procedures for oral applications and introduces a marker system.
B. MERGERS
CADE blocked the acquisition of concrete producer CimentoTupi by PolimixConcreto,
ordering the parties to unwind the transaction, 4 after concluding that the acquisition
would result in market shares of up to eighty percent in local markets and would increase
the probability of both unilateral effects and coordination.
In both Telefinica/eko/TelecomItalia and Oi/Brasil Telecom, CADE made the approval of
the transactions subject to the adoption of behavioral remedies to safeguard competition.s
SEAE issued an economic opinion recommending that CADE require substantial dives-
titures in order to allow the merger of Brazil's leading food processors to proceed.6
C. ANTrCOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
CADE fined five industrial and medical gas manufacturers 2.3 billion reais (approxi-
mately US$1.35 billion) for collusion, price-fixing, market division, and bid-rigging, 7 after
finding that the cartel in question had been active since at least 1998. This fine is the
highest one imposed in the history of antitrust enforcement in Brazil. Substantial fines
were also imposed on the companies' executives.
2. See Senado Federal, Projeto de Lei da Cimara n' 6, de 2009 [Legislative Bill from the House of Repre-
sentatives n. 6 of 20091 (Braz.), available at http://www.senado.gov.br/sflatividade/Materia/Detalhes.asp?p-
cod-mate=892 89.
3. Portaria No. 456, de 15 de Margo de 2010, Diaro Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] 50: 28 de 16.3.2010
(Braz.).
4. See generally Conselho Administrativo De Defesa Economica [Admin. Council for Econ. Def.][CADE],
Ato de Concentragio No. 08012.002467/2008-22 (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.cade.gov.br/temp/t2812011132
02956.pdf.
5. Conselho Administrativo De Defesa Economica [Admin. Council for Econ. Def.], Ato de Concentra-
lio No. 53500.012487/2007 (Apr. 28, 2010), http-//www.cade.gov.br/uploadfTCD-AC-2007-53500-012487-
Telefonica-RAGAZZO.pdf.
6. See Secretaria de Acompanhamento Econ6mico [Secretariat of Econ. Monitoring], Ato de Concentra-
glo No. 08012.004423/2009-18, Parecer No.06510/2010/RJ (June 29, 2010), http://www.seae.fazenda.
gov.br/destaque/parecer-seae-ac-08012-004423-2009-18-perdigao-e-sadia.
7. Conselho Adninistrativo De Defesa Economica, Processo Administrativo No. 08012.009888/2003-70
(Sept. 22. 2010), http://www.cade.gov.br/temp/D-DO00000555711078.pdf.
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D. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
AmBev has challenged a CADE decisions imposing a fine of approximately US$200
million for adopting a loyalty program of non-linear pricing and discounts which allegedly
induced exclusivity and/or the acquisition of target quantities in the downstream market.
AmBev has argued that (i) SDE violated its constitutional and procedural rights during the
inspections conducted in the company's headquarters, and (ii) CADE failed to demon-
strate actual harm or negative effects on competition and consumer welfare. A decision is
pending.
E. COURT DECISIONS
The Superior Court of Justice overturned a decision by the Federal Court of Appeals
subjecting transactions in the banking and financial industry to antitrust scrutiny.9
A number of recovery actions were filed against steel producers for customer allocation,
resale price maintenance and price fixing in the steel rebar market, following a ruling by
CADE.1o Associations of construction companies pressed ahead with a collective antitrust
action against the steel rebars producers," seeking injunctive relief and damages.
A major collective action for injunctive relief and damages filed by associations of hospi-
tals against an alleged cartel of suppliers of medical gases 12 was resumed in 2010 after a




The most significant development in 2010 was the implementation in March of the new
per se conspiracy offense under the Canadian Competition Act ("the Act").13 The new
offense prohibits competitors from entering into agreements that: "(i) fix, maintain, in-
crease or control the price for the supply of a product; (ii) allocate sales, territories, cus-
tomers or markets for the production or supply of a product; or (iii) fix, maintain, control,
prevent, lessen or eliminate the production or supply of a product."1 4 The new offense
does not require the prosecution to prove that the agreement in question had an undue
impact on competition or resulted in an unreasonable increase in prices.
8. TRF-1, Ap. No. 2009.34.00.028766-7, Relator: 09.02.2009, REVISTA DO TRIBUNAL REGIONAL FED-
ERAL [R.T.R.F.] (Braz.).
9. See S.T.F., No. 2008/0173677-1, Relatora: Eliana Calmon, 25.8.2010, R.TJ. (Braz.), available at
https://ww2.stj.jus.br/processo/jsplivrao/mainPage.jsp?seqiteor=915164.
10. See Conselho Administrativo De Defesa Economico, Processo Administrativo No. 08012.004086/2000-
21 (Sept. 5, 2005) (Braz.), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/templDDD00000137611642.pdf.
11. TRF-1, No. 2009.34.00.035755-7, Relator: 21.10.2009, REVISTA DO TRIBUNAL REGIONAL FEDERAL
[R.T.R.F.] (Braz.).
12. TRF-1, No. 002409709934-5, Relator: 19.01.2010, REVISTA DO TRIBUNAL REGIONAL FEDERAL
[R.T.R.F.] (Braz.), available at http://www.tjmg.jus.br/juridico/sf/proc-resultado.jsp?listaProcessos=09709934
&comrCodigo=24&numero=1.
13. Budget Implementation Act, 2009, S.C., c. 2, s. 45 (Can.).
14. Id.
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Maximum penalties are now fourteen years of imprisonment and a CDN$25 million
(approximately US$25 million) fine per count, up from the previous maximums of five
years and CDN$10 million (approximately US$10 million) per count.15 Liability can be
avoided under the new offense if it can be established that: (i) the impugned agreement is
"ancillary to a broader or separate agreement that includes the same parties;" (ii) the im-
pugned agreement is "directly related to, and reasonably necessary for giving effect to, the
objective of that broader or separate agreement;" and (iii) the "broader or separate agree-
ment, considered alone, does not contravene" the conspiracy offense.16
The Act also now contains a new civil provision that applies to agreements between
competitors that have the effect of lessening or preventing competition substantially. Ap-
plications under this new provision are brought by the Commissioner of Competition to
the Competition Tribunal. Relief is limited to an order requiring the parties to cease
engaging in the impugned conduct or, on consent, to taking any other action.
B. MERGERS
The Competition Bureau ("the Bureau") secured divestitures from a number of merg-
ing parties in 2010. For example, in June 2010, the Bureau announced that it reached an
agreement with IESI-BFC Ltd. and Waste Services Inc. requiring divestitures of commer-
cial waste collection assets of Waste Services Inc. in five Canadian cities as a condition for
obtaining approval of the proposed merger.' 7 Divestitures were also secured by the Bu-
reau in a number of international mergers, including: Ticketmaster/Live Nation,"
Nufarm/A.H. Marks,19Teva/Ratiopharm,20 Novartis/Alcon,21 and The Coca-Cola Com-
pany's acquisition of the North American business of its primary bottler, Coca-Cola En-
terprises Inc.22
15. Budget Implementation Act, s. 45.
16. Budget Implementation Act, s. 90.1.
17. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Requires Significant Divestitures in
Waste Services Merger (June 29, 2010), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/
eng/03256.html.
18. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Requires Divestitures by Ticketmaster-
Live Nation to Promote Competition Uan. 25, 2010), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.caleic/
site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03191.html.
19. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Requires Divestitures in Herbicide
Merge (uly 28, 2010), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03264.html.
20. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Requires Divestitures in Teva/rati-
opharm Merger (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.competitionbureau.ge.caleic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/
03271.htmi.
21. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Secures Divestitures in Novartis' Acqui-
sition of Alcon (Aug. 9, 2010), available at http-J/www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03274.
html.
22. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Requires Remedy in Coca-Cola Acqui-
sition (Sept. 27, 2010), available at http-J/www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03290.html.




A Bill implementing the amendments to the Constitution regarding class actions was
published. If enacted, it will modify various provisions of the Federal Code on Civil Pro-
cedures and the Federal Law on Economic Competition. 23
Additionally, the Mexican President submitted a bill to Congress to, among other mat-
ters, increase the amount of fines imposed for antitrust infringements, introduce criminal
liability for cartel activity, provide for the possibility of applying interim measures, facili-
tate the inspection procedure, and provide for a more detailed regulation on joint domi-
nance. The Bill requires the approval of both the House of Representatives and the
Senate. 24
B. MERGERS
The Federal Competition Commission ("the FCC") authorized the acquisition by the
Mexican broadcasting company Televisa of thirty to forty percent of Nextel's shares, as
well as the indirect acquisition by AmdricaM6vil of 71.5% of Telifonos de M6xico's voting
shares, and up to 100% of TelmexInternacional's shares. 25 It also authorized the Cydsal
Mexichem merger in the PVC market, subject to conditions. 26
C. ANTiCOMPETYTIVE PRACTICES
Four investigations were initiated in relation to the following markets: tortilla, freight
services, air tickets, and flexible transmission means of alternating power sources. 27
23. De La Comisi6n De Puntos Constitucionales, Con Proyecto De Decreto Por El Que Se Adiciona Un
Pirrafo Tercero Y Se Recorre El Orden De Los Pirrafos Subsecuentes Del Articulo 17 De La Constituci6n
Politica De Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Gaceta Parlamentaria, Cdmara de Diputados No. 2976-IV, Mar.
25, 2010 (Mex.), available at http://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/61/2010/mar/20100325-IV.html.
24. President Felipe Calderon, Decreto Por El Que Se Reforman, Adicionan Y Derogan Diversas Disposi-
ciones dela Ley Federal de Competencia Economica [Decree Amending, Supplementing and Repealing vari-
ous Provisions of the Federal Law Economic Competition], Gaceta Parlamentaria, Cimara de Diputados No.
2976-IV, Apr. 6, 2010 (Mex.), http://www.cfc.gob.mx/images/stories/Noticias/iniciativa%20presidencial%20
Ifce.pdf.
25. Press Release, Comision Federal de Competencia [Fed. Competition Comm'n], Aprueba CFC Con-
centraciones Televisa-Nextel yTelmex-TelCel [Approval of CFC-Nextel Merger Televisa and Telmex-Telcel
] (Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/images/stories/Noticias/Comunicados/3.-concentra-
cionestelevisa-nextelytelmex-telcel.pdf.
26. Press Release, Comision Federal de Competencia, Impone CFC Condiciones a la Concentracion de
Mexichem Con Subsidiarias de Cydsa (Aug. 24, 2010), available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/index.php/
COMUNICADOS/comunicados-2010.html.
27. See generally Extracto Del Acuerdo por el que la Comisi6n Federal de Competencia Inicia La Investiga-
ci6n por Denuncia Identificada Bajo el Nilmero de Expediente DE-014-2010, por la Posible Comisi6n de
Pricticas Monop6licas Absolutas en el Mercado de la Producci6n, Distribuci6n y Comercializaci6n de Masa y
Tortillas de Maiz en el Municipio de Tuxtla Gutidrrez, Chiapas [Extract Agreement Federal Competition
Commission Initiated the Investigation on Complaints Identified Under the File Number DE-014-2010, for
the Commission of Absolute Monopolistic Practices in the Market Production, Distribution, and Marketing
of Mass and Tortillas Corn in the Municipality of Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas] Diaro Oficial de la Federacion
[D.O.], 28 de Julio 2010 (Mex.); Presidencia y Secretaria Ejecutiva, Comision Federal de Competencia,
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The FCC confirmed the decision finding pharmaceutical companies liable for bid rig-
ging regarding the sale of insulin to a public Mexican Healthcare Institution28 and the
imposition of fines on PCTV shareholders for refusing to provide acquired TV signals to
its competitors and dividing up markets by allocating territories. 29
D. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
Seven investigations were initiated in relation to: home improvement products, airport
services, beer, home furniture, advertising spaces regarding the marketing of real estate,
local and domestic long-distance dedicated access services to carriers, and exported guava
markets. 30 The FCC reduced the fine imposed on Televisa in its decision of November
Deschamiento por Expediente No. DE-020-2010 (Oct. 6., 2010); Extracto Del Acuerdo por el que la Comis-
i6n Federal de Competencia Inicia La Investigaci6n por Denuncia Identificada Bajo el Nsimero de Ex-
pediente DE-004-2010, por la Posible Comisi6n de Pricticas Monop6licas Absolutas en el Mercado de
Prestaci6n, Producci6n, Distribuci6n y Comercializaci6n de Insumos y Servicios para la Reserva y Venta de
Boletos de Transporte Aireo de Pasajeros en el Territorio Nacional [Extract of the Agreement by Which the
Federal Competition Commission Initiated Complaint Investigation Identified Under the File Number DE-
004-2010, for the Commission of Absolute Monopolistic Practices in the Market for the Provision, Produc-
tion, Distribution, and Marketing of Inputs and Services for Booking and Ticketing of Air Travel in the
Country], Diaro Oficial de la Federacion [D.O.], 13 de Mayo 2010 (Mex.); Extracto del Acuerdo por el que la
Comisi6n Federal de Competencia inicia la investigaci6n de oficio identificada bajo el mimero de expediente
10-002-2010, por la posible comisi6n de pricticas monop6licas absolutas en el mercado de la producci6n,
procesamiento, distribuci6n y comercializaci6n de sistemas flexibles de transmisi6n de corriente alterna en el
territorio nacional [Extract of the Agreement by Which the Federal Competition Commission Began an
Official Investigation Identified Under the File Number 10-002-2010, for the Commission of Absolute Mo-
nopolistic Practices in the Market for the Production, Processing, Distribution, and Marketing Systems Flexi-
ble Alternating Current Transmission in the Country], Diaro Oficial de la Federacion [D.O., 19 de Febrero
2010 (Mex.).
28. Press Release, Comision Federal de Competencia, Confirma CFC Multa de 150 Millones de Pesos a
Empresas Farmaceuticas Por Colusion Contra el IMSS [CFC Confirms Fine of 150 Million Dollars to Phar-
maceutical Companies for Collusion Against the IMSS] (June 23, 2010), available at http-//www.cfc.gob.mx/
index.php/COMUNICADOS/comunicados-2010.html.
29. Comision Federal de Competencia, Resumen Expediente [Summary Record] No. DE-001-2006-I
(Mex.), available at http-//resoluciones.cfc.gob.mx/Docs/Asuntos%20Juridicos/V35/21/1331180.pdf.
30. See generally Extracto Del Acuerdo por el que la Comisi6n Federal de Competencia Inicia La Investiga-
ci6n por Denuncia Identificada Bajo el Nimero de Expediente DE-013-2010,por Pricticas Monop6icas Re-
lativas Previstas en las Fracciones VIII y XI del Articulo 10 de la Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica, en
el Mercado de la Vents a Comercializaci6n de Productos para la Mejora del Hogar en Tiendas de
Autoservicio [Extract of the Agreement by Which the Federal Competition Commission Initiated Complaint
Investigation Identified Under the File Number DE-013-2010, for Monopolistic Practices Provided in Sec-
dons VIII and XI of Article 10 of the Federal Law of Economic Competition in the Market for the Sale or
Marketing of Products for the Home Improvement Stores], Diaro Oficial de la Federacion [D.O.], 9 de
Augusto 2010 (Mex.); Extracto del Acuerdo por el que la Comisi6n Federal de Competencia inicia la investi-
gaci6n por denuncia identificada bajo el munero de expediente DE-011-2010, por Pricticas Monop6licas
Relativas Previstas en las Fracciones V y X del Articulo 10 de la Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica, en
los Mercados de la Prestaci6n de Servicios Aeroportuarios y Complementarios, as omo el de la Asignaci6n de
horarios de Despegue y Aterrizaje, en el Aeropuerto Internacional de la Ciudad de M6xico [Extract of the
Agreement by Which the Federal Competition Commission Initiated Complaint Investigation Identified
Under the File Number DE-01 1-2010, for Monopolistic Practices Provided in Sections V and X of Article 10
of the Federal Law of Economic Competition in the Markets for the Provision of Airport Services and Com-
plementary, and the Allocation of Takeoff and Landing Times at the International Airport of Mexico City],
Diaro Oficial de la Federacion [D.O.], 18 de Augusto 2010 (Mex.); Extracto del Acuerdo por el que la Comis-
i6n Federal de Competencia inicia la Investigaci6n por Denuncia Identificada Bajo el mimero de expediente
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2009 for the refusal to supply its open TV signals.3' In January, the FCC declared that
TELCEL was an economic agent with significant market power in the national mobile
telephone market. 32
DE-012-2010, por Pricticas Monop6licas Relativas Previstas en las Fracciones VIII y XI del Articulo 10 de la
Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica, en los Mercados de Servicios de Distribuci6n, Comercializacidn y
Venta de Bebidas Normalmente Conocidas como Cervezas [Extract of the Agreement by Which the Federal
Competition Commission Initiated Complaint Investigation Identified Under the File Number DE-012-
2010, for Monopolistic Practices Provided in Sections VIII and XI of Article 10 of the Federal Law of Eco-
nomic Competition in the Markets for Distribution Services, Marketing and Sale of Beverages Commonly
Known as Beer] Diaro Oficial de la Federacion [D.O.], 9 de Augusto 2010 (Mex.); Extracto del Acuerdo por
el que la Comisi6n Federal de Competencia Inicia la Investigaci6n por Denuncia Identificada Bajo el Nminero
de Expediente DE-01 5-2010, por Pricticas Monop6licas Relativas Previstas en las Fracciones II, VIII y XI del
artfculo 10 de la Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica, en el Mercado de la Proveedurfa o Comercializa-
ci6n de Muebles para el Hogar en la Regi6n del Estado de Jalisco [Extract of the Agreement by Which the
Federal Competition Commission Initiated Complaint Investigation Identified Under the File Number DE-
015-2010, for Monopolistic Practices Under Sections II, VIII and XI of Article 10 of the Federal Competi-
tion Law Economic, Market, or Marketing proveedurfa Home Furnishings in the Region of the State of
Jalisco], Diaro Oficial de la Federacion [D.O.], 18 de Augusto 2010 (Mex.); Extracto del Acuerdo por el que
la Comisi6n Federal de Competencia inicia la investigaci6n por denuncia Identificada Bajo el Ntimero de
Expediente DE-01-2010, por pricticas monop6licas Relativas Previstas en las Fracciones V y VI del articulo
10 de la Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica, en los Mercados de la Venta de Espacios de Publicidad para
la Comercializaci6n de Bienes Inmuebles en Revistas y de los Sistemas de Listados Milltiples Electr6nicos de
Bienes Inmuebles Disponibles para so Comercializaci6n [Extract of the Agreement by Which the Federal
Competition Commission Initiated Complaint Investigation Identified Under the File Number DE-01-2010,
for Monopolistic Practices Provided in Sections V and VI of Article 10 of the Federal Law of Economic
Competition in the Markets for the Sale of Advertising Space for the marketing of Real Estate Magazines and
Electronic Systems for Multiple Listings of Property Available for Sale], Diaro Oficial de la Federacion
[D.O.], 26 de Marzo 2010 (Mex.); Extracto del Acuerdo por el que la Comisi6n Federal de Competencia
Inicia la Investigaci6n por Denuncia Identificada Bajo el Nilmero de Expediente DE-008-2010, por Pricticas
Monopdlicas Relativas Previstas en las Fracciones V, X y XI del articulo 10 de la Ley Federal de Competencia
Econ6mica, en los Mercados de Servicios Mayoristas de Arrendamiento de enlaces Dedicados locales y de
Larga Distancia Nacional. [Extract of the Agreement by Which the Federal Competition Commission Initi-
ated Complaint Investigation Identified Under the File Number DE-008-2010, for Monopolistic Practices
Provided in Sections V, X and XI of Article 10 of the Federal Competition Law Economic Markets Whole-
sale Leasing Services Dedicated Links Local and Domestic Long Distance], Diaro Oficial de la Federacion
[D.O.], 29 de Abril de 2010 (Mex.); Extracto del Acuerdo por el que la Comisi6n Federal de Competencia
Inicia la Investigaci6n de Oficio Identificada Bajo el Ndmero de Expediente 10-006-2009, por Pricticas
Monop6licas Relativas Previstas en las Fracciones I, II, III, IV, V y X del Articulo 10 de la Ley Federal de
Competencia Econ6mica, en el Mercado de la Producci6n, Distribuci6n y Comercializacidn de Guayabas de
Exportaci6n [Extract of the Agreement by Which the Federal Competition Commission Began an Official
Investigation Identified Under the File Number 10-006-2009, Provided by Monopolistic Practices in Sec-
tions I, II, III, IV, V and X of Article 10 of the Federal Law on Economic Competition in the Market
Production, Distribution, and Marketing of Export Guavas], Diaro Oficial de la Federacion [D.O.], 18 de
Enero de 2010 (Mex.).
31. Comision Federal de Competencia, Recurso de Reconsideracion Expediente No. RA-003-2010 [Re-
consideration Appeal Record No. RA-003-2010], available at http://www.cfe.gob.mx/index.php/RESOLU-
CIONES-Y-OPINIONES/buscador-de-resoluciones-y-opiniones-de-la-cfc.html.
32. Press Release, Comision Federal de Competencia, Confirma La CFC Dominancia de Telcel en el Mer-
cado Final de Telefonia Movil [The CFC Confirms Telcel Dominance in Final Mobile Phone Market] (Feb.
2, 2010), available at http://68.178.170.101/images/stories/Noticias/Comunicados/2.dominanciaentelefonia
movil.pdf.
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E. COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court granted constitutional relief to Coca Cola FEMSA against the
FCC resolution finding it liable for exclusionary conduct.33 The FCC was ordered to
issue a new resolution taking into account evidence put forward by the defendant that was
not properly admitted and assessed in the previous proceeding. 34
IV. United States
A. ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Department of Justice ("DOJ"), Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Com-
mission ("FTC," together the "Agencies") jointly released Revised Merger Guidelines35 to
reflect actual practices.
The FTC also released a study36 demonstrating the costs of "pay-for-delay" agreements
between pharmaceutical companies and continues to urge Congress37 to enact legislation
to limit this practice that delays entry of generic versions of branded drugs, especially in
the face of continuing setbacks in court. 38
B. MERGERS
This year, an increasing number of mergers played out in the bankruptcy context,39 the
Agencies continued to challenge several consummated mergers,40 and international coor-
33. Suprema Corte de Justicia, Practicas Monopolicas: Casa Coca Cola FEMSA y Otras, CRONICAS DEL PLENO
Y DE LAS SALAS (2010), http://www.scjn.gob.mx/Micrositios/unidadcronicas/Sinopsis%20de%20Asuntos%20
destacados%20de%201as%2OSalas/1S-090610-JRCD-2127.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice Issue
Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/08/
hmg.shtm.
36. Pay for Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offi Cost Consumers Billions, FED. TRADE COMM'N, 1 (2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
37. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Testimony: Stopping "Pay-for-Delay" Drug Settlement
Agreements is a Top Competition Priority (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/07/
antitrust.shtm.
38. Arkansas Carpenters Health v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 108 (2d Cit. 2010), reh'g denied, 604 F.3d 98 (2d
Cir. 2010) (holding Cipro reverse settlement did not violate antitrust laws; both DOJ and FTC submitted
amicus briefs urging a rehearing en banc).
39. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Fidelity National Financial Settles FTC Charges that its Acquisi-
tion of LandAmerica Subsidiaries Reduced Competition in Title Information Markets (July 16, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/07/fidelity.shtm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Order
Requires Tops Markets to Sell Seven Penn Traffic Supermarkets (Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/opa/2010/08/tops.shtm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Requires Conditions for Pilot Corpo-
ration's Takeover of FlyingJ Inc.'s Travel Center Business (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2010/06/flying.shtm.
40. See, e.g., In re Polypore, 2010 WL 866178 (F.T.C.), affd 2010 WL 5132519 (F.T.C.) (Administrative
Law Judge ruled in favor of FTC's 2008 complaint that Polypore's acquisition of rival battery separator
manufacturer violated antitrust law); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Order Restores Competition
in U.S. Markets for Herbicide Products (uly 28, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/07/
nufarm.shtm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Houghton International Agrees to Sell Aluminum Produc-
tion Assets to Settle Charges That 2008 Acquisition of Stuart was Anticompetitive (July 14, 2010), available at
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dination facilitated the efficient resolution of mergers affecting multiple jurisdictions.4'
Two mergerS42 also required behavioral remedies, despite the Agencies' preference for
structural remedies. Google/AdMob was cleared without conditions.43
The FTC continues to challenge44 Ovation Pharmaceutical's January 2006 acquisition
of the drug NeoProfen despite a district court decision that the merger was not anticom-
petitive because the drugs were not in the same product market.45
C. ANlCOMPETrrIVE PRACTICES
Although criminal enforcement was not as dramatic as last year, the DOJ succeeded for
the first time in extraditing a foreign defendant on antitrust charges.46
In civil enforcement, health care remains a priority.47 The DOJ also revived its scrutiny
of the payment cards industry, challenging merchant rules imposed by American Express,
Visa, and MasterCard.4 8
The FTC charged U-Haul with violating Section 5 of the FTC Act by inviting Budget
to fix prices on truck rentals, even though no agreement had been reached.49
D. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
The FTC settled charges against Intel for allegedly engaging in "anticompetitive tactics
to cut off rivals' access to the marketplace" in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.50
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/07/houghton.shtm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Challenges
LabCorp's Acquisition of Rival Clinical Laboratory Testing Company (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://ftc.
gov/opa/2010/12/labcorp.shtm.
41. Press Release, Dep't of Just., Justice Department Will Not Challenge Cisco's Acquisition of Tandberg
(Mar. 29, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press releases/2010/257173.htm; Press Re-
lease, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Order Protects Consumers in U.S. Market for Eye Care Drug Used in
Cataract Surgery (Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/08/novartis.shtn.
42. Press Release, Dep't of Just., Justice Department Requires Ticketmaster Entertainment Inc. to Make
Significant Changes to its Merger With Live Nation Inc. Gan. 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/press releases/2010/254540.pdf; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Puts Conditions on
PepsiCo's $7.8 Billion Acquisition of Two Largest Bottlers and Distributors (Feb. 26, 2010), available at http:/
/www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/02/pepsi.shtm.
43. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Closes its Investigation of Google AdMob Deal (May 21,
2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/05/ggladmob.shtm.
44. Notice of Appeal, FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., No. 08-6379 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2010), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0810156/101028ovationpharmnotice.pdf.
45. FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 2010 WL 3810015 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010).
46. Jane Croft, Erecutive Finally Ertradited to US, Fn. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
68dbe8ee-36e5-1 ldf-bc0f-00144feabdcO.html.
47. See Press Release, Dep't of Just., Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit Against Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Michigan (Oct. 18, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2010/
263227.pdf.
48. Press Release, Dep't of Just., Justice Department Sues American Express, MasterCard and Visa to
Eliminate Rules Restricting Price Competition; Reaches Settlement with Visa and MasterCard (Oct. 4, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press releases/2010/262867.pdf.
49. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, U-Haul and Its Parent Company Settle FTC Charges That They
Invited Competitors to Fix Prices on Truck Rentals (June 9, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/
06/uhaul.shtm.
50. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Settles Charges of Anticompetitive Conduct Against Intel
(Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/08/intel.shtin.
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E. COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court decided two important antitrust cases. In American Needle v. Na-
tional Football League, the Court refused to treat a joint venture as a single entity immune
from violating Section 1 of Sherman Act.5 1 In Stolt-Nielsen SA et al. v. Animalfeeds Interna-
tional, the Court held that class arbitration proceedings against several shipping companies




In 2010, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ("ACCC") indicated
that its focus would be on mergers that directly affect "consumer's hip pockets," particu-
larly in industries like petrol and telecommunications. Since December 2009, it has pub-
licly opposed five mergers.53
B. ANTICOMPETTTIVE PRACTICES
The ACCC continues to take action against airlines in the air cargo industry, bringing
proceedings against Korean Air Lines, Malaysian Airline System, Malaysia Airlines Cargo,
Japan Airlines, and Air New Zealand. The ACCC has brought fifteen proceedings against
airlines, six of which have settled.54 Significant financial penalties for cartel conduct,
ranging from $1 million (approximately US$990,000) to $9.2 million (approximately
US$9.1 million), were imposed in four other proceedings.55
C. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
Two companies, Baxter Healthcare56 and Cabcharge Australia Limited,57 were required
to pay penalties of $8.5 million (approximately US $8.3 million) and $15 million (approxi-
mately US$14.8 million), respectively, for their misuse of market power. The Cabcharge
51. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2206-07 (2010).
52. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
53. The ACCC opposed Breville Group's proposed acquisition of GUD Holdings, Caltex Australia's pro-
posed acquisition of Mobil Oil Australia's retail assets, Cargill Australia's proposed acquisition of Goodman
Fielder's edible fats and oils business, Link Market Services' proposed acquisition of Newreg, and National
Australia Bank's proposed acquisition of AXA Asia Pacific Holdings.
54. Proceedings involving Socidtd Air France, KoninklijkeLuchtvaartMaatschappij, Martinair Holland,
Qantas, and British Airways have settled. Proceedings against Singapore Airlines Cargo, Cathay Pacific Air-
ways, Emirates, PT Garuda Indonesia, and Thai Airways International remain active.
55. APRIL Fine Paper Trading and a related company, DRS C3 Systems, four, foreign-based suppliers of
marine hose, and penalties were imposed on seventeen companies and twenty-two individuals involved in an
air conditioning cartel.
56. ACCCOUNT A Report of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's Activities, AusrRAuAN
COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM'N, 1 (2010).
57. Press Release, Australian Competition & Consumer Comm'n, Cabcharge Penalized for Misuse of Mar-
ket Power (Sept. 24, 2010), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itenId/948779.
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penalty is the highest imposed in misuse of market power proceedings brought by the
ACCC and was based, in part, on the first application of higher penalties which apply to
conduct engaged in after January 1, 2007.
VI. China
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Over the last year, several implementing regulations and guidelines have been issued to
address: (i) procedural rules for non-merger investigations;58 (ii) turnover calculation in
the review of mergers between financial enterprises;5 9 (iii) market definition; 60 and (iv)
merger control rules regarding notification,61 review, 62 and remedies.63
B. MERGERS
The Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM"), which is responsible for merger control,
handled more than 140 pre-merger notifications through June 2010,6 with one third en-
tering second phase review and five percent ultimately being either prohibited or given
conditional clearance. Beyond the statutory review periods, MOFCOM often requires
additional information before accepting the filing and starting the initial waiting period.
Most cases take three months from initial filing to clearance, but more difficult ones have
taken over nine months.
MOFCOM has blocked one transaction, Coca-Cola's proposed acquisition of
Huiyuan, 65 and has conditionally approved six others: InBev-Anheuser-Busch, Mitsubishi-
Lucite, GM-Delphi, Pfizer-Wyeth, Panasonic-Sanyo, and Novartis-Alcon. These seven
published MOFCOM merger decisions demonstrate increasing transparency but reflect
an emphasis on market shares and a somewhat skeptical view of vertical relationships.
58. Industrial and Commercial Administrative Organs to Investigate Monopoly Agreements, Abuse of Dominant
Position Cases, Procedures, STATE ADMIN. FOR INDUS. & COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CINA,
2009, http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/zyfb/qt/fld/200906/t20090605_61123.html.
59. Ministry of Commerce of the P.R.C People's Bank of China Banking Regulatory Commission, China
Securities Regulatory Commission China Insurance Regulatory Commission Order No. 10 of 2009 (Ministry
of Commerce of the P.R.C, July 21, 2009) (CHINA), available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/c/
200907/20090706411691.html.
60. State Anti-Monopoly Comm. on the Definition of Relevant Market Guide, AwrI-MONOPOLY COMm.
(promulgated May 24, 2009), http://www.gov.cn/zwhd/2009-07/07/content_1355288.htm.
61. Measures Declaration of Business Concentration (promulgated by the MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF
THE P.R.C.: Anti-monopoly Bureau July 15, 2009, effective Jan. 1, 2010) (China), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/c/200911/20091106639149.htnl.
62. Examination of Concentration of Business Operators (promulgated by the MINISTRY OF COMMERCE
OFTHE P.R.C.: AN-I-MONOPoLy BuREAuJuly 15, 2009, effectiveJan. 1, 2010) (China) http://fldj.mofcom.
gov.cn/aarticle/c/200911/20091106639145.html.
63. MINIsTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE P.R.C.: ANTI-MONOPOLY BUREAU, Ministry of Commerce Notice No.
41 of 2010 on the Implementation of the Concentration of Assets or Business Operations of the Interim Provisions
Stripping (2010), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/c/201007/20100707012000.html.
64. MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE P.R.C., Anti-Monopoly Ministry of Commerce held a press conference
(Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/ai/201008/20100807078063.html.
65. Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Ministry of Commerce to Review the Deci-
sion on the Prohibition of the Coca Cola's Acquisition of Huiyuan Firm, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/
ztn/200903/20090306108494.html.
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C. ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The National Development and Reform Commission ("NDRC"), which is responsible
for price-related conduct, announced enforcement actions against several cartels during
2010, including: (i) rice noodle producers;66 (ii) green bean distributors;67 and (iii) a trade
association for requiring local companies to offer refrigeration services to garlic distribu-
tors at a fixed price. These resulted in fines of between RMB20,000 (approximately
US$3,000) and RMB1 million (approximately US$150,000).68 Although the cases were
brought under the earlier Price Law, they also shed light on likely cartel enforcement
trends under the Anti-Monopoly Law ("AML").
D. COURT DECISIONS
The courts have accepted over ten civil AML cases so far.69 Nearly all cases involved
allegations of abuse of a dominant market position. One-third were settled, while the
others were unsuccessful, mainly due to insufficient evidence.
VII. India
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Competition (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009 and the Competition (Amendment)
Act, 2009,70 dissolved the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices ("MRTP") Com-
mission, bringing an end to the delayed repeal of the MRTP Commission provided for in
the Competition Act, 2002 ("Competition Act"). All cases pending before it are to be
transferred either the Competition Appellate Tribunal ("COMPAT") or the National
Commission established under the Consumer (Protection) Act, 1986, depending on the
subject matter.
B. MERGERS
The merger control provisions are not yet in force. However, certain unofficial reports
indicate that they may become effective shortly. Further, the existing provisions may be
modified to: (i) increase the existing turnover thresholds; (ii) add additional thresholds
66. Nat'l Dev. & Reform Comm'n, Interview with the Person in Charge of the National Development and
Reform Commission, available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/xwfb/t20100330-338105.htm (discussing collusion
on prices of rice in parts of Guangxi, Quan).
67. Nat'l Dev. & Reform Comm'n, Interview with the Person in Charge of Strengthening the Supervision
of Agricultural Markets in Quan, available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/xwfb/t20l00701 358444.htm.
68. Peter Wang et al., Antitrust Alert: Chinese Pricing Enforcers Impose Higher Fines as New Rules Proposed,
JONEs DAY, July 2010, http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert-chinese-pricing-enforcers-impose-higher-
fines-as-new-rules-proposed- 0 7-2 1-2010/.
69. Wang Doudou, Ten Civil Cases Initiated During the First Two Years, LEGAL DAILY (Aug. 30, 2010) http://
www.legaldaily.com.cn/index&article/content/2010-08/30/content_2264422.htn?node=5955.
70. The MRTP Act was repealed effective September 1, 2009 and MRTP Commission was dissolved effec-
tive October 14, 2010. Pallavi Shroff & Harman Sandhu, Competition Commission oflndia's Trysts with Law and
Policy: Enforcement One Year On, COMPErrON PoL' INr'L, Dec. 16, 2010, https-d/www.competitionpolicy-
international.com/competition-commission-of-india-s-trysts-with-law-and-policy-enforcement-one-year-on/
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regarding the size of the target; and (iii) reduce the time for reaching a clearance decision
to a maximum of 180 days.
C. COURT DECISIONS
1. Competition Commission v. Steel Authority7'
In its first decision on the Competition Act, the Supreme Court decided several impor-
tant questions related to operation of the Competition Act. It held that (i) the COMPAT
does not have jurisdiction to hear appeals from orders based on provisions not specifically
contained in the Competition Act; (ii) parties have no affirmative right to be heard before
the Competition Commission of India ("CCI") orders a detailed investigation by its Di-
rector General ("DG"); (iii) the standard of proof that must be satisfied before interim
relief may be granted in the event of a competition law infringement is much higher than
that required to show a prima facie case in order for an investigation to be initiated by the
DG; and (iv) the CCI must give reasons for its orders. The Supreme Court also issued
directions with respect to confidentiality and the timetable for completing the
investigation(s).
2. Kingfisher Airlines v. Competition Commission72
Kingfisher Airlines and Jet Airways announced a cooperation agreement on, inter alia,
code sharing, joint fuel management, and common ground handling in October 2008 that
was challenged as being anticompetitive. The Bombay High Court decided that the
CCI's jurisdiction extended to cover all anticompetitive agreements in force in India after
the relevant provisions of the Competition Act73 became effective, regardless of when
those agreements were first entered into. More recently, the CCI fined Kingfisher Air-
lines Rs.10,000,000 (approximately US$220,000) for failing to provide information re-
quested by the DG during the investigation.74
3. Other Decisions
The CCI has published several decisions closing cases on the basis that no prima facie case
existed without going into any in-depth substantive analysis under the Competition Act.
The reasons for taking such action include: (i) failure to supply sufficient information;75
71. Competition Comm'n v. Steel Auth. of India, Ltd., (2010) - S.C.R. _ (India), available at http://cci.
gov.in/menu/civilAppealNo.7779.pdf.
72. Kingfisher Airlines v. Competition Comm'n, 2009 A.I.R. - (Bom.) (India), available at http://bombay
highcourt.nic.in/data/original/2010/WPl1806093103 10.pdf.
73. See Section 3 of The Competition Act, Act. No. 12 of 2003, INDIA CODE, available at http://www.cci.
gov.in/images/media/competition..act/act2002.pdf~phpMyAdmin=QuqXb-8V2yTtoq6l7iR6-k2VA8d.
74. See, e.g., CCIImposes Rs I CR Fine on Kingfsher Airlines, ECON. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 2010, http://economic-
times.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-industry/transportation/airlines-/-aviation/CCI-imposes-Rs- 1-cr-fine-
on-Kingfisher-Airlines/articleshow/696450 1.cms.
75. See Goel v. Seagate Singapore Int'l Headquarter, Ltd., No. C- 35/2008/DGIR, f 8-9 (Sept. 21, 2010)
(India), available at http://cci.gov.in/menu/SeagateCaseNoC35.pdf; All India Distillers' Ass'n v. Haldyn
Glass, Ltd., No. DGIR/2008/IP/1 1, 11 10-11 (June 18, 2010) (India), available at http://cci.gov.in/menu/
AllIndiaDistAssol709l0.pdf.
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(ii) the other party is a government ministry and therefore not an enterprise;76 (iii) the
action arose before the relevant provisions of the Competition Act came into force;"7 (iv)
the action complained of was a sovereign function of government;78 and (v) the CCI was




During a year of lower merger activity, of particular note are the ongoing reviews of the
proposed intra-Greek combination of flag carrier Olympic Air and Aegean Airlines,80
which is reminiscent of the blocked intra-Ireland Ryanair/Aer Lingus merger (upheld on
appeal), and the European Commission's unconditional clearance of Oracle's acquisition
of Sun Microsystems (following public pledges by Oracle to support Sun's open-source
database software).8s
B. ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The Commission imposed high fines on companies found guilty of anti-competitive
behavior. These included fines imposed on cartels in the bathroom equipment and
prestressing steel sectors of C622 million and C458 million (approximately US$870 million
and US$640 million) respectively.82 The Commission also improved the efficiency of its
76. Travel Agents Ass'n of India v. Balmer Lawrie & Co., No. 39/2010, 1 9.6 (Sept. 15, 2010) (India),
available at http://cci.gov.in/menu/BalnerCaseNo39.pdf.
77. Kishan Cold Storage v. United Bank of India, No. 27/2010, 8 (Aug. 31, 2010) (India), available at
http://cci.gov.in/menulKishanCaseNo27.pdf; Maharashtra Textile v. Maharashtra Indus. Dev., No. 17/2009,
15 (Mar. 9, 2010) (India), available at http://cci.gov.in/menu/CCA17.pdf; Ackruti City, Ltd. v. Reliance
Infrastructure, Ltd., No. 09/2010, T 9 (Mar. 30, 2010) (India), available at http://cci.gov.in/menu/CCAO9.pdf;
Agarwal v. Punjab Nat'1 Bank, No. 08/2009, T 8 (Mar. 18, 2010) (India), available at http://cci.gov.in/menu/
CCA08.pdf.
78. Internet Serv. Providers v. Dep't of Telecomms., No. 10/2009, $1 5-7 (une 29, 2010) (India), available
at http://cci.gov.in/menu/CaseNolO-2009.pdf.
79. Meena v. Mohan Gas Service, No. C-22/2009/DGIR, 114-5 (Feb. 4, 2010) (India), available at http://
cci.gov.in/menu/MRTPC2.pdf.
80. Press Release, Europa, Mergers: Commission Opens In-Depth Investigation Into Proposed Merger
Between Olympic Air and Aegean Airlines (July 30, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/10/101 7.
81. Press Release, Europa, Mergers: Commission Clears Oracle's Proposed Acquisition of Sun Microsys-
tems (an. 21, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/40; Com-
mission merger decisions are available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases.
82. Press Release, Europa, Antitrust: Commission Fines 17 Bathroom Equipment Manufacturers C622
Million in Price Fixing Cartel (une 23, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/10/790&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; Press Release, Europa,
Antitrust: Commission Fines Prestressing Steel Producers 458 million for Two-Decades Long Price-Fixing
and Market-Sharing Cartel (Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer-
ence=IP/10/1297&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. European Commission anti-
trust decisions are online. Antitrust Cases, EUROPEAN COMM'N: COMPETrTION, http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/cases/index.hmI (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
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prosecution efforts by successfully using its new settlement procedure in two cases. 83 In
the pharmaceutical sector, following the conclusion of the sectoral inquiry, the Commis-
sion initiated infringement proceedings against several companies and continued its prac-
tice of monitoring patent settlement agreements.
C. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
In the realm of abuse of dominance, the Commission's focus continued to be on the
behavior of companies in the high-tech industry, with two cases against IBM regarding
mainframe computers, 84 as well as an investigation into Apple's iPhone policies, which
closed after Apple changed its practices to remove the Commission's concerns.85
D. COURT DECISIONS
The Commission secured a significant victory in the EU General Court, which upheld
its 2005 decision against AstraZeneca for actions taken to hinder the entry of generic
competitors.86 In a disappointing judgment for the business community, the Court of
Justice held that internal communications with in-house lawyers are not covered by legal




The French Competition Authority ("the Authority"), which replaced the Minister of
Economic Affairs as the authority in charge of merger control in March 2009, issued its
first ever phase-two clearance decision in connection with the acquisition by TF1 (the
main free-to-air TV channel in France) of NTl and TMC (two free digital TV channels
in France). The Authority held that despite the relatively small NT1 and TMC market
shares (less than five percent in all affected markets), the transaction would strengthen
TFl's dominant position in the market for television advertising and increase its bargain-
83. The Commission's settlement procedure is available online. Legislation Settlements, EUROPFAN
COMM'N: COMPETYION, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/legislation/settlements.html (last visited
Feb. 4, 2011).
84. Press Release, Europa, Commission Initiates Formal Investigations Against IBM in Two Cases of Sus-
pected Abuse of Dominant Market Position Only 26, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/10/100 6.
85. Press Release, Europa, Statement on Apple's iPhone Policy Changes (Sept. 25, 2010), available at http:/
/europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/l 175.
86. Press Release, Europa, Judgment in Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v. Comm'n Guly 1, 2010), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-07/cp100067en.pdf. AstraZeneca has appealed
the judgment.
87. Press Release, Europa, Judgment in Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Ltd. v. Comm'n (Sept.
14, 2010), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-09/cpl00090en.pdf.
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ing power with respect to the purchase of broadcasting rights.88 The clearance decision
was made subject to strict behavioral commitments from TFl.
B. ANnCOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The Authority fined eleven banks a total of C385 million (approximately US$511 mil-
lion) for colluding on interbank fees for checks.89 The collusive arrangements were de-
signed and agreed upon when a new digital system for processing and clearing checks was
introduced, and had been in force for a number of years.
A small French company, NavX, which sells databases containing the locations of speed
cameras, filed a complaint alleging abusive practices after Google refused its advertise-
ments and suspended its AdWords account on the grounds that its products did not com-
ply with Google's internal content policies. Google undertook to restore NavX's
AdWords account and to clarify both the scope of its AdWords traffic devices policy in
France and the procedure that may lead to suspension of AdWords accounts for violation
of Google's traffic devices policy in France. Following a market test, the Authority con-
cluded that these commitments were sufficient to remove the competition concerns raised
during the procedure.90
C. COURT DECISIONS
The Paris Court of Appeals drastically reduced the fines imposed by the Authority on
several steel producers for horizontal anticompetitive practices from a total of C575 mil-
lion (approximately US$764 million) to C75 million (approximately US$99 million), on
the grounds that the fines were disproportionately high given the ongoing economic cri-
sis, the infringement had only a moderate impact on the market, and the Authority did not
sufficiently individualize the level of the fines imposed. 91 Although this judgment was
considered to be a "serious blow" to the Authority, it was not appealed by the Minister of
Economic Affairs, who decided instead to set up an expert committee to review the meth-
88. National Competition Report, CLEARY GorrLIEB 7 (2010), http://www.cgsh.com/files/Publication/
aeldd747-236c-4a27-a275-ff66a7025872/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/713de05d98964bff9e8a02867
38fe794/National%2oCompetition%2OReport%20Ql%202010.pdf.
89. D6cision n' 10-D-28 du 20 septembre 2010 relative aux tarifs et aux conditions lides appliqules par les
banques et les 6tablissements financiers pour le traitement des chhques remis aux fins d'encaissement [Deci-
sion No. 10-D-28: Relating to Rates and Conditions Applied by Banks and Related Financial Institutions in
Processing Checks for Collection], (L'Autorit6 de la Concurrence [The Competition Authority] Sept. 20,
2010) (Fr.), available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/lOd28.pdf; Banks Fined C385m for
Cheque Fees, IusH TIMES, Sept. 20, 2010, http://www.irishtimes.cori/newspaper/breaking/2010/0920/break-
ing35.htmL.
90. D6cision no 10-D-30 du 28 octobre 2010 relative a des pratiques mises en oeuvre dans le secteur de la
publicit6 sur Internet [Decision No. 10-D-30: Relating to Practices Implemented in the Area of Internet
Advertising] (L'Autoriti de la Concurrence [The Competition Authority] Oct. 28, 2010) (Fr.), available at
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/lOd3O.pdf; Eric Pfanner, Google, in Settlement, Changes Ad
Rules in France, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/technology/29google.
html?_r=1.
91. Cour d'appel [CAl [regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch., Jan. 19, 2010, JCP 2009, II, 00334 (Fr.),
available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/ca08d32_sidertrgie.pdf, (Fr.); Kiran S. Desai & Manu
Mohan, Reduction of Fines-Eonomic Recession-Not at the Commission-Cartel Fines Cross 1.4 Billion at the End of
June 2010, MAYER BROWN (July 2010), http://www.mayerbrown.comAondon/article.asp?id=9288&nid=369.
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odology for calculating antitrust fines. In its report, this committee presented several rec-
ommendations to strengthen safeguards of due process rights in proceedings before the
Authority and suggested adopting guidelines for the method of calculating antitrust sanc-
tions.92 The Authority issued such guidelines at the end of 2010.
The Supreme Court reversed a ruling of the Paris Court of Appeals upholding the
Authority's decision to suspend the exclusivity period granted to Orange over the sale of
iPhones in France. The Supreme Court held that the Paris Court of Appeals had not only
failed to assess whether Orange's competitors had alternatives to the iPhone and could
therefore offer a competing solution to their customers, but also overestimated the reve-
nues that Orange would receive as a result of the exclusivity period. 93 However, Orange




In January 2010, Germany's Federal Ministry of Economics published controversial
draft legislation proposing amendments to the Act against Restraints of Competition,
which would confer on the Federal Cartel Office ("FCO") the ability to order dominant
undertakings to divest certain parts of their businesses, even in the absence of an abuse of
their market position or any other anticompetitive behavior.95 The draft Bill raises signif-
icant policy and constitutional concerns. Discussion of this proposed legislation is ex-
pected to continue through 2011 or 2012.
B. MERGERS
In the merger field, the FCO prohibited the automotive component supplier Magna
from acquiring Karmann's European convertible roof systems business on the grounds of
92. Rapport sur l'appriciation de la sanction en matire de pratiques Anticoncurrentielles [Report on the Assess-
ment of Sanctions in the Field of Anticompetitive Practices], LE MINISTERE DE L'CONOMIE, DES FINANCES
FT DE L'INDUSTRIE [THE MINISTRY OF ECONomy, FINANCE AND INDUSTRY], (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.
economie.gouv.fr/services/rapO/100920rap-concurrence.pdf Eric Morgan de Rivery & Charles de
Navacelle, Antitrmst Alert: French Competition Authority Launches Public Consultation on Setting Antitrust Fines,
JoNEs DAY, Jan. 21, 2011, http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert-french-competition-authority-
launches-public-consultation-on-setting-antitrust-fines-01-21-2011/.
93. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], -- , Feb. 16, 2010, D.P. I 2010, 226 FS-
D (Fr.), available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/cass_08mcOl fev2010.pdf; Frencb Court Up-
holds Ban on iPhone-Orange Deal, KIOSKEA.NET, Feb. 4, 2009, http://en.kioskea.net/news/1 1957-french-court-
upholds-ban-on-iphone-orange-deal.
94. Dicision no 10-D-01 du 11 janvier 2010 relative a des pratiques mises en oeuvre dans la distribution des
iPhones [Decision No. 10-D-01: Relating to Practices Implemented in the Distrubution of iPhones],
(L'Autorit6 de la Concurrence [The Competition Authority] Jan. 11, 2010) (Fr.), available at http://www.
autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/vis/1OdO1.pdf; Melissa Lipman, Apple, Orange iPhone Proposals Prove Fruitful
in France, LAw360, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/145088/apple-orange-iphone-
proposals-prove-fruitful-in-france.
95. Press Release, Monopoly Comm'n (Ger.), Mergers and Abuse Control, 32 (July 14, 2010), available at
http://www.monopolkommission.de/haupt_18/presse hl8.pdf.
SPRING 2011
56 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
collective dominance.96 The FCO had found that there were only three competitors left
in the European market for convertible roof systems and ruled that Magna and Karmann
were likely to act in a coordinated manner given their similar size and the transparency of
the market.
C. CARTELS AND ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
Fines were imposed for price fixing on coffee roasters (C30 million, approximately
US$40.76 million)97 and manufacturers of ophthalmic lenses (l 15 million, approximately
US$156.28 million),98 while Alstom was fined for bid rigging in relation to the sale of
utility steam generators (C91 million, approximately US$123.66 million).
In January 2010, the FCO ordered Scandlines Deutschland GmbH, the owner of the
Puttgarden ferry port, to provide other ferry companies with access to the port facilities in
return for adequate remuneration, so they could establish an additional ferry service on
the Puttgarden-Redby route.99
D. CoURT DECISIONS
In October 2009, the Berlin Kammergericbt held that direct and indirect purchasers
could bring damages claims, and ruled the defendant in the case in question had not
proved the existence of passing on. 00 However, in a June 2010 judgment, the Karlsruhe
Higher Regional Court went significantly further, rejecting the passing-on defense on
legal grounds.101 The court also ruled that indirect purchasers did not have legal standing
to bring claims against cartel members, mainly because it would be impossible to resolve
the ensuing claims between direct and indirect purchasers. Both cases have been appealed
to the Federal Supreme Court.
96. Recent Developments in Competition Law, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, (2011) http-//www.arnoldporter.
com/resources/documents/AdvisoryRecentDevelopmentsjIn.GermanCompetitionLaw_1411 .pdf.
97. See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Imposes More Fines on Coffee Roasters (June 9,
2010), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/News/Archiv/ArchivNews2010/201006_09.
php.
98. See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, C115 Million Fine Imposed on Manufacturers of Ophthalmic
Lenses (une 10, 2010), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/News/Archiv/ArchivNews
2010/2010_0610.php.
99. See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Opens up the Puttgarden-Redby Ferry Route to
Competition (Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://cms.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/News/Archiv/Archiv
News2010/2010_01_28.php.
100. Kammergericht [KGI [Berlin Court of Appeals] 2 U 10/03 Kart (Oct. 1, 2009) (Ger.), available at http:/
/snipurl.com/lwdyom; Kammergericht [KG] [Berlin Court of Appeals], 2 U 17/03 Kart (Oct. 1, 2009) (Ger.),
available at http://snipurl.com/lwdyyd; National Competition Report, CLEARY GOTTLIEB, (Dec. 2010), http://
www.cgsh.com/files/Publication/8c9b9f5e-b943-458b-9a43-9fa366cec907/Presentation/PublicationAttach-
ment/27cdl9bf-01 5f-4d8c-adaa-a47e78e47c20/National%2OCompetition%20Report%204Q%202009.pdf
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, RECENT DEvs. IN GERMAN COMPETYTION LAw 4 (2011), http://www.arnold
porter.com/resources/documents/Advisory-RecentDevelopments_1n_GernanCompetition-Law-1411.
pdf.
101. Higher Regional Court Karlsruhe, Case 6 U 118/05 Kart (une 11, 2010) (Get.), available at http-//
snipurl.com/1bcywd; see Recent Developments in Competition Law, supra note 96, at 4.




During the first halfof 2010, a significant milestone in Russian antitrust legislation was
reached with the adoption and implementation of the Second Antimonopoly Package.
This package encompasses amendments to the Federal Law on the Protection of Compe-
tition ("the Competition Law"),102 the Code of Administrative Offenses, 03 and the Crim-
inal Code of the Russian Federation.10 4
The Second Antimonopoly Package introduced a new approach to the scope of the
Competition Law. The changes affect the agreements and actions of both Russian firms
and foreign businesses operating in Russia, or any activity which has an effect on the state
of competition in Russia.
In the sphere of merger control, the thresholds for transactions subject to antimonopoly
clearance or notification were almost doubled. According to the amended Competition
Law, the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation ("FAS Russia") can
consider a company with a market share of less than thirty-five percent to be dominant,
provided that: (i) its market share exceeds that of any other company, and (ii) it can influ-
ence significantly the circulation of goods and services in the market. A new regulation
was also issued for vertical and horizontal agreements.
The legislation still suffers from certain defects, in particular its unreasonable severity
and, in some instances, excessive regulation. The Third Antimonopoly Package, aimed at
eliminating these shortcomings, has already been submitted for consideration to the Gov-
ernment of the Russian Federation and is expected to be approved by the Russian Parlia-
ment in spring 2011.105 The revised provisions on extraterritoriality, direct and indirect
control, restrictive agreements and concerted practices, merger control, and liability are
expected to increase the efficiency of antitrust regulation and hopefully improve the qual-
ity of antitrust enforcement in Russia.
XII. United Kingdom
A. ADmnIsTRATvIE DEVELOPMENTS
On October 14, 2010, the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills issued
proposals to merge the competition and market investigation functions of the Competi-
tion Commission ("CC") and the Office of Fair Trading ("OFT"). The merger is unlikely
to be completed until 2012.106
102. Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation]
2006, No. 135-FZ, translated at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/legislation/26940.shtml.
103. Kodeks RF obAdministrativnykh Pravonarusheniiakh [KOAPI [Code of Administrative Violations] art.
195 (Russ.), available at http://www.russian-offences-code.com/.
104. Ugolovnyi Kodeks (Criminal Code] art. 64 (Russ.), available at http://www.russian-criminal-code.com/.
105. Andrey Tsyganov, The "Third Antimonopoly Package" Will be Liberalizing the Norms ofAntimonopoly Law,
FED. AN-nMONOPOLY SERV. OF THE RussIAN FED'N, Dec. 16, 2010, http://en.fas.gov.ru/news/news_31087.
html.
106. OFTICC Merger-a System With Mired Motives, LEGALWEEKLAW.COM, (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.
legalweeklaw.com/abstract/oft-cc-merger-mixed-motives-5632#.
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B. MERGERS
Only two notified mergers were referred to the CC,107 with one subsequently aban-
doned.1os The Secretary of State for Business, Vince Cable, has issued a European Inter-
vention Notice in relation to News Corp's proposed acquisition of the shares it does not
already own in BSkyB. The intervention has been made in order to protect so-called
legitimate interests, in this case sufficient plurality of persons with control of media enter-
prises. In parallel, the European Commission is investigating the impact of the proposed
acquisition under the EU Merger Regulation.
On September 16, 2010, the OFT and the CC published new joint OFT/CC Substan-
tive Merger Assessment Guidelines.109
C. ANTrCOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
April 2010 saw the imposition by the OFT of a record total fine of £225 million (ap-
proximately US$360.5 million), on two tobacco manufacturers and ten retailers.110 Ian
Norris, former head of Morgan Crucible engineering group, was extradited to the United
States on March 23, 2010 to face obstruction of justice charges after his attempts to have
his case heard by the European Court of Human Rights failed. In May 2010, the OFT
dropped its criminal cartel prosecution of four current and former executives of British
Airways. 1 In June 2010, the OFT released revised guidance on Competition Disqualifi-
cation Orders in competition cases.112
D. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
The OFT announced that Reckitt Benckiser has agreed to pay a fine of £10.2 million
(approximately US$16.3 million) for abuse of dominance in relation to the Gaviscon
drug.113 In February 2010, the fine imposed on National Grid in 2008 in an abuse of
107. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading (U.K.), OFT Refers Car Club Merger to the Competition Com-
mission (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2010/89-10.
108. Press Release, Competition Comm'n (U.K.), CC Cancels Getty/Rex Inquiry (uly 21, 2010), available at
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref20 10/GettyRex/pdf/
23 10getty-images rex cancellation newsrelease_210710.pdf.
109. Merger Assessment Guidelines, COMPE=nON COMM'N (U.K.) (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.competi-
ton-commission.org.uk/about us/our-organisation/workstreams/analysis/cc2_review.htn.
110. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT Imposes £225m Fine Against Certain Tobacco Manufactur-
ers and Retailers Over Retail Pricing Practices (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-
updates/press/2010/39-10.
111. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT Withdraws Criminal Proceedings Against Current and
Former BA Executives (May 10, 2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2010/47-
10.
112. See generally, Director Disqualification Orders in Competition Cases an OFT An OFT Guidance Document,
OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING (2010), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/businessleaflets/enterprise-act/oft510.
pdf.
113. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, Reckitt Benckiser Agrees to Pay £10.2 Million Penalty for Abuse
of Dominance (Oct. 15, 2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2010/106-10.
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dominance decision was further reduced by the Court of Appeal to £15 million (approxi-
mately US$24 million).114
E. COURT DECISIONS
In Cooper Tire v. Dow Deutschland, the Court of Appeal confirmed the position that an
English-domiciled person may anchor a private follow-on competition damages claim in
England despite not being addressees of the European Commission's decision. 5 In De-
cember 2009, the Competition Appeal Tribunal ("CAT") issued its first substantive judg-
ment in a follow-on action under section 47A of the Competition Act 1998.116
Middle East And Africa
XIII. Israel
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Government recently introduced a draft bill proposing extensive regulation of
oligopolistic markets.' 7 Another proposed bill would for the first time authorize the Di-
rector General of the Israeli Antitrust Authority ("IAA") to impose fines for violating the
Restrictive Trade Practices Law 1988.118 The IAA also published draft guidelines regard-
ing the analysis of horizontal mergers. 119
B. MERGERS
The Director General blocked two horizontal mergers: (i) a merger that would have
resulted in a perfect monopoly in the development and supply of real-time stock informa-
tion systems, 120 ruling that such systems were a distinct relevant market for professional
investors (distinct from private investors), into which prompt and effective entry by new
competitors was unlikely; and (ii) a "4-to-3" merger in the interlocking paving stones
114. See Nat'1 Grid PLC v. Gas and Elec. Mkts. Auth., [20101 EWCA (Civ) 114 (Eng.), available at http://
www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2010/114.htnl.
115. See Cooper Tire v. Dow Deutschland, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 864 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.
org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2010/864.htmI
116. See Enron Coal Servs. Ltd. v. English Welsh & Scottish Ry. Ltd., [2009] CAT 4, available at http://
www.catribunal.org.uk/files/1 106_Enron_-.Ruling_09.02.10.pdf.




8 79 9 7
.
118. Memorandum of the Restrictive Trade Practices Law (Amendment No. 12), 2010, Sept. 19,2010, pub-
lication No. 5001663, available at http://62.219.23.243/ANTItem.aspx?ID=10567&FromSubject=100184&
FromYear=2010&FromPage=0.
119. Press Release, Israeli Antitrust Auth., Horizontal Mergers Guidelines (Dec. 22, 2009), available at http:/
/archive.antitrust.gov.il/ANTItem.aspx?ID=10148&FromSubject=100199&FromYear=20O0&FromPage=0.
120. See Antitrust Comm'r, Objection to a Merger: A-Online Capital (AOC) Ltd., KavManche Information
and Telecommunication Services and KavManche Let-Me-Know Technology Ltd., http://archive.antitrust.
gov.il/ANTItem.aspx?ID=10406&FromSubject= 100040&FromYear-20 10&FromPage=0.
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market,121 concluding that the merger might have aggravated perceived coordinated ef-
fects. In the latter case, the parties sought to invoke a failing firm defense, arguing that
the target company had decided independently to exit the market. The argument was
rejected in order not to encourage the engineering of transactions so as to circumvent the
merger control rules.
C. ArlCOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
An indictment was filed against the leading food chain, Shufersal Ltd., and its managers
for attempting to reach a restrictive arrangement with its distributors and for infringing
the conditions imposed on Shufersal in connection with the Shufersal/Clubmarket
merger.122 Allegedly, Shufersal decided to stop purchasing from suppliers who would not
comply.
D. COURT DECISIONS
The District Court ofJerusalem convicted Mudgal (the monopolist producer of plumb-
ing equipment in Israel), its distributors, and the latter's managers of minimum price fix-
ing in the market for pipe fittings.123 The court rejected the argument that Mudgal had
only introduced recommended prices, ruling that price recommendations in the frame-
work of a joint meeting with its distributors actually led to an agreement between the
participants, albeit tacitly, to adopt the recommendation.
XIV. South Africa
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In March 2010, the Competition Commission ("the Commission") published new ser-
vice standards for merger reviews, to replace the previous 2001 standards.124 The stan-
dards are intended to help the Commission become "a high performance regulatory
agency with realistic, predictable and achievable service standards in finalizing merger
cases."'
25
The new standards establish three categories of mergers, depending on the complexity
of investigation required: non-complex, complex, and very complex mergers. The Com-
121. Ronit Kan, Director General's Opposition to Merger Among S.C. Ackerstein RO S.R.L., ACKERSTEIN INDUS.
& NETIvEI Noy 1 (2009), http://eng-archive.andtrust.gov.il/files/202/Ackerstein%20and%20Netivei%20
Noy.pdf.
122. Publication No. 5001572, ISRAELI ANTITRUsT Aurm., (July 2010), http://archive.antitrust.gov.il/files/
10319/07-2010.pdf; Eytan Epstein, Tamar Dolev-Green & Shiran Shabtai, Israel, 2011 GLOBAL COMPET-
TION REV. 210, 215-16 (2011), available at http://ecglaw.com/uploaded/Merger%20Control%20201 1.pdf.
123. See generally, C.D. (er) 1274/00 Israel v. Mudgal Ltd. et al., [2010] Publication No. 5001596, available
athttp://62.219.23.243/ANTItem.aspx?ID-10372&FromSubject=100069&FromYear=2010&FromPage=0.
124. Service Standards, COMPETrTION COMM'N (S. Afr.), http://www.compcom.co.za/service-standards (last
visited Feb. 4, 2011).
125. Maarten van Haven, M&A Service Standards 2010, COMPETITON NEws 12 (June 2010), http://www.
compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/June-2010-newsletter-Final-Draft.pdf.
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mission also published guidelines on the information required for each category of
filing.126
B. MERGERS
The Commission reported a marked decrease in large and intermediate merger notifi-
cations in 2010. Of this type of mergers, most were found to raise few competition con-
cerns, and were approved unconditionally or with minor conditions. The Commission
noted that several mergers notified during this period involved firms in financial distress.
Many of these transactions raised employment concerns 27 and the Commission accord-
ingly focused on formulating conditions to ameliorate these effects.
C. ANrCOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The Commission continued to focus on cartel investigations in 2010 and referred a
significant number of complaints to the Competition Tribunal for prosecution. Over the
past year, the Commission has investigated price fixing, customer and market allocation,
and setting of trading conditions in the following industries: milling, bicycle, airline,
scrap metal, and tire. The most important cartel case in 2010 was the Pioneer Foods
bread cartel case in which the Tribunal imposed a fine of R195,718,614 (approximately
US$27,812,425), which constitutes ten percent of the turnover of Pioneer Foods' baking
division in the 2006 financial year.128 Pioneer Foods and the Commission appealed to the
Competition Appeal Court. The appeals were withdrawn by both parties after Pioneer
concluded a settlement agreement with the Commission, which also related to alleged
anticompetitive conduct by Pioneer in the milling, poultry, and egg industries. Eighteen
complaints were settled in 2010 through consent orders confirmed by the Tribunal.
D. CouRT DECISIONS
There were two important decisions by the Supreme Court of Appeal on competition
law issues in 2010: first, the Telkom casel 29 involving the exercise of concurrent jurisdic-
tion by the telecommunication authority, ICASA, and the competition authorities; and
second, the procedural decision in the milk cartel case,'30 which examined the power of
the Commission to initiate its own complaints into potentially anti-competitive conduct.
126. See generally, Practitioner Update Issue 6: Complete Merger Filing Requirements, COMPETITION COMM'N
(S. Afr.), (Mar. 2010), http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/Complete-
fling-notice-Mch-2010.
127. Maarten van Hoven, Merger Review, COMPrEiTON COMM'N (S. Afr.), 10 (June 2010), http://www.
compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/June-2010-newsletter-Final-Draft.pdf
128. Tribunal Imposes Penalty ofR195 Million on Pioneer, COMPETITION CoMM'N (S. Afr.), (2010), http://
www.compcom.co.za/assetsfUploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/TRIBTNAL-IMPOSES-PENALTY-
OF-R195-MILLION-ON-PIONEER.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
129. See generally, Competition Comm'n v. Telkom 2009 (2) All SA 433 (SCA) (S. Afr.), available at http://
www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2009/155.pdf.
130. See generally, Woodlands Dairy v. Competition Comm'n 2010 (6) SA 108 (SCA) (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2010/104.pdf.
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